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Abstract
Converting malware into images followed by vision-
based deep learning algorithms has shown superior threat
detection efficacy compared with classical machine learn-
ing algorithms. When malware are visualized as images,
visual-based interpretation schemes can also be applied to
extract insights of why individual samples are classified as
malicious. In this work, via two case studies of dynamic
malware classification, we extend the local interpretable
model-agnostic explanation algorithm to explain image-
based dynamic malware classification and examine its in-
terpretation fidelity. For both case studies, we first train
deep learning models via transfer learning on malware im-
ages, demonstrate high classification effectiveness, apply
an explanation method on the images, and correlate the re-
sults back to the samples to validate whether the algorith-
mic insights are consistent with security domain expertise.
In our first case study, the interpretation framework iden-
tifies indirect calls that uniquely characterize the underly-
ing exploit behavior of a malware family. In our second
case study, the interpretation framework extracts insightful
information such as cryptography-related APIs when ap-
plied on images created from API existence, but generate
ambiguous interpretation on images created from API se-
quences and frequencies. Our findings indicate that current
image-based interpretation techniques are promising for ex-
plaining vision-based malware classification. We continue
to develop image-based interpretation schemes specifically
for security applications.
1. Introduction
Malware is malicious software created for harming
users, computers, and networks. Viruses, trojan horses,
worms, spyware, and ransomware are examples of malware.
In malware detection, static analysis without executing the
application is a quick method to detect malicious patterns in
an application. To avoid static detection most malware con-
tain obfuscated code. Dynamic analysis, on the other hand,
executes the code and records the malware runtime behav-
ior. Even though dynamic analysis is slower than static
analysis, it offers better resiliency and efficacy against mal-
ware code obfuscation.
Machine learning has become increasingly popular and
important for malware detection because it can generalize
to detect new malware families. The manual effort of fea-
ture engineering can be costly, especially on unstructured
data formats. As the volume of data continues to grow at
increasing speed, scalable algorithms for malware detec-
tion are in high demand. Computer vision has provided a
unique perspective for performing malware classification.
First, it enables natural visualization on malware as a whole
entity. Second, deep learning has demonstrated state-of-
the-art performance for image classification. When mal-
ware is represented as images, transfer learning can lever-
age the superior performance from vision to classify mal-
ware with accelerated training speed and maintained clas-
sification efficacy. Last but not least, it has superior per-
formance compared with classical machine learning algo-
rithms [16, 15, 22, 7, 6].
For static malware analysis, a binary can be directly
mapped to pixel values between 0 and 255 [16, 15, 22, 7, 6].
By visually inspecting binaries plotted as grey-scale im-
ages, we can observe the textural and structural similarities
or dissimilarities on the static features of malware. By con-
trast, there are fewer vision-based dynamic malware classi-
fication techniques. [7] proposed a hierarchical ensemble
neural network scheme on dynamic telemetries collected
from Intel R© Processor Trace, where the control flow pack-
ets are converted into time series of images and demon-
strated the superior performance compared with other pop-
ular dynamic malware classifiers.
For security applications, besides classification efficacy,
model explanation is equally important for security re-
searchers and practitioners to deploy the model in the wild.
Sensible interpretation from the model on why a sample is
predicted as malicious or benign can generate valuable in-
sights to triage malware families, identify new malware sig-
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natures, understand the evolution of polymorphic malware,
and enhance the practitioner’s trust in the model. When
malware is represented as images, interpretation schemes
for natural images [17] can be extended to explain malware
classification.
Unlike natural images, where interpretation fidelity can
be assessed via human eyes, interpretation fidelity on mal-
ware images remains to be validated through security do-
main expertise. In this paper, via two case studies for
dynamic malware classification, we investigate the effec-
tiveness of local-interpretable model-agnostic explanation
(LIME) framework [17] specifically for image-based dy-
namic malware analysis. Our first case study examines dy-
namic malware images generated from predictions on se-
quences of instructions. The interpretation framework iden-
tifies indirect calls that uniquely characterize the underlying
exploit behavior of a malware family. In our second case
study, we consider three types of malware images generated
from API existence, API sequence, and API frequency fea-
tures. The interpretation framework provides insightful in-
formation such as crypto-related APIs when applied on im-
ages created from API existence, but generates ambiguous
information on images created from API sequences and fre-
quencies. Our findings indicate that current image-based in-
terpretation techniques are promising for vision-based mal-
ware classification. We plan to develop image-based inter-
pretation schemes specifically for malware images in secu-
rity applications.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• To the best of the authors’ knowledge, we are the
first to validate the interpretation fidelity of a model-
agnostic interpretation framework, using security do-
main expertise, on dynamic image-based malware
classification.
• We use deep transfer learning on dynamic malware im-
ages generated from instruction sequence predictions,
API existence, API sequence, and API frequency fea-
tures and demonstrate that dynamic malware image
analysis is highly effective.
• Our case studies present a valuable combination of ma-
chine learning and domain expertise to fully under-
stand the effectiveness of malware classification algo-
rithms.
• We advocate that interpretation is another important
dimension to evaluate malware classifiers. Vision-
based interpretability highlights the advantage of ap-
proaching the malware problem from a computer vi-
sion direction so that interpretation becomes concrete
as to indicate the actual locations of potential mali-
cious signals.
2. Background and Related Work
In the interpretation frameworks for image classification,
the explanation method provides interpretation by identi-
fying the most contributing pixel regions to the prediction
result [9, 10, 14, 17]. While there is an abundance of vi-
sion and natural language based interpretation frameworks,
few exist specifically for security applications. In [11],
the authors proposed non-linear approximation on the lo-
cal decision boundary to explain malware detection algo-
rithms for security applications. The method is primarily
for multi-layer perception (MLP) and recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) on non-image based data representations for
malware classification. [6] employed interpretation frame-
works such as the local-interpretable model-agnostic expla-
nation (LIME) [17] for natural images on static malware
images.
When we represent dynamic malware as images, natu-
ral image explanation schemes can be applied. In two case
studies here, we extend LIME to image-based dynamic mal-
ware classification and thoroughly examine the interpreta-
tion fidelity using security domain knowledge.
3. Case Studies
3.1. Case Study I
Our first case study is concerned with detecting anoma-
lies in dynamic program control-flow traces. The task is
to examine whether PDF files opened by Adobe Acrobat
Reader are malicious or not in a Windows R© system. The
source of our control-flow data is Intel R© Processor Trace
(Intel R© PT), which is a hardware feature present in modern
Intel R© processors [7]. Intel R© PT produces a large volume
of data within a short time period. For example, tracing
Acrobat Reader for one minute yields over 2 million in-
direct control-flow transfers including returns and indirect
calls and jumps. It becomes a daunting task for human an-
alysts to examine such a high volume of transfers for signs
of exploitation. Hence it is desired to employ the automated
interpretation framework to extract an explanation.
We collect 1,249 benign and 1,314 malicious traces from
the pdfka malware family, where each trace is collected
from the targeted program opening a PDF document. Each
trace is then disassembled, yielding a linear sequence of the
executed basic blocks. A basic block is defined as a se-
quence of linear instructions ending with a branch, which
can be a return, call, jump, conditional branch and so on.
Each basic block is assigned a universally unique integer
defined as BBID. A fixed length sliding window is moved
over the sequence of BBIDs, and a subsequent long short
term memory (LSTM) neural network is tasked with learn-
ing and predicting the next BBID for any sub-sequence end-
ing with an indirect control-flow transfer. The intuition be-
hind predicting only indirect transfers is that these are the
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Figure 1. Interpretation for a pdfka sample. White pixels are
correct predictions by the underlying model and black incorrect.
Green denotes strong support whereas red is strong contradiction.
The green regions shown highlight a suspicious control-flow loop.
only places where control-flow hijacking can occur during
a program execution. The LSTM model is trained using
only normal traces of the target program and then its per-
formance is monitored over unlabeled traces. If an anomaly
occurs in the trace, this will cause the model’s performance
to drop below a defined threshold and the trace will be la-
beled anomalous.
The dynamic malware images are generated from the
prediction of the LSTM model on the BBIDs, where
the white pixels are correct predictions and black pixels
are incorrect predictions. On these malware images, we
apply deep transfer learning using the pre-trained VGG
model [20] on ImageNet, freeze the top layers and add an
additional two fully connected layers, each with dropout, to
retrain on the dynamic malware images. The training and
test split is 0.8 : 0.2. We set the number of epochs to be 50
with early stopping criterion if the validation loss does not
decrease after 10 epochs. We use the model checkpointed
at the 32-th epoch. The classification accuracy on the test
set is 100%. This result demonstrates the effectiveness of
vision-based deep transfer learning approach for dynamic
malware detection and thus it makes sense to examine what
interpretation can be generated using the decision bound-
aries from this model.
Next we apply the interpretation framework on the gen-
erated images to examine the fidelity of explanation. Fig-
ure 1 shows the interpretation of one of the pdfka fam-
ily traces. Our model marks several spots within a large
streak of incorrect predictions as strongly supporting that
this trace belongs to the pdfka set. From here we can re-
verse these chunks of BBIDs to get back to the executed
instructions. Upon manual inspection, we discover that at
this point in the trace, the program makes one particular
indirect call several hundred times in a row. By looking
at the relative virtual address, we determine that this activ-
ity is happening inside the part of AcroRd32.dll that parses
TIFF images. The most well-known vulnerability in this
part of the program is CVE-2010-0188, which matches sev-
eral online reports about this family’s behavior [4]. We also
manually confirm that this pattern does in fact appear in all
the pdfka traces and none of the benign traces. To further
verify, we also create and trace several benign documents
containing benign TIFF images and confirm none of them
produce the anomalous pattern. Although Acrobat Reader
is closed source, making indisputable verification difficult,
we believe our manual analysis strongly supports that our
interpretation model successfully identified the subsection
of the pdfka traces that uniquely characterizes the underly-
ing exploit this family relies on. This case study demon-
strates the usefulness of the interpretation method on dy-
namic malware images.
3.2. Case Study II
In our second case study, we evaluate three models de-
signed to classify WindowsR Portable Executable (PE) files
as either malicious or benign. All three models use dynamic
features produced by malware and benign software during
execution.
Our malware dataset is comprised of 13,394 WindowsR
PE samples. These samples were collected from the Geor-
gia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) using their internal mal-
ware collection and analysis platform APIARY [1]. Using
AVClass [19], our malware dataset is made up of 247 fami-
lies (demonstrating the diversity of our samples).
Our benign dataset is made up of 5,772 samples and was
collected by crawling CNET [2]. Specifically, our samples
are a mix of WindowsR PE and WindowsR Installer (MSI)
files under 22 different categories (according to CNET)
ranging from Audio to Education to Business-related soft-
ware.
We ran all of our samples for 2 minutes using a mod-
ified version of Cuckoo [3] version 1.2 in Windows 7 32-
bit KVM virtual machines with network and random-access
memory (RAM) hardware extensions. We used KVM and
hardware extensions to introduce as few artifacts indicative
of a malware analysis environment as possible. Malware
authors have been known to check for system and network-
related artifacts (e.g., registry key values and network tim-
ing) which they can use to evade analysis (e.g., by perform-
ing innocuous activities or terminating early) [13, 12, 8, 18].
To improve the quality of our malware dataset, we only in-
clude samples which ran for the full 2 minutes without ter-
minating early. We also executed the malware samples with
3 days of them being collected by the organization to im-
prove the chances that the malware would perform mali-
cious activities. Finally, to improve the quality of our be-
nign dataset, we only include samples which did not have
more than 2 antivirus companies label them as malicious via
VirusTotal [5]. We also use Cuckoo to automatically inter-
act with the benign software (via fake mouse-clicks on its
GUI) to cause it to reveal a variety of behaviors (namely the
installation process).
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Figure 2. Interpretation for a dynamic malicious image created
from API existence. The large light green areas in the top left
image denote support regions for the malicious class. The sup-
ported regions that contribute to malicious prediction focused on
cryptography-related API calls and HTTP-related calls.
On each set of the dynamic malware images generated
from API existence, sequence, and frequency, we again ap-
ply transfer learning via VGG network pre-trained on Ima-
geNet, where we freeze the top layers and add customized
two additional fully connected layers and a softmax layer
to produce the classification result. The training and valida-
tion split is 0.8:0.2. We set the number of epochs to be 50
with early stopping criterion if the validation loss does not
decrease after 10 epochs. The classification results on three
models are the same within statistically significance with an
accuracy at 95%. Then we apply the interpretation scheme
on each of the three datasets and the decision boundaries
generated by the corresponding classifiers.
The interpretation framework on API call frequencies
and existence generate similar insights, where we find
that one of our malicious sample interpretations focused
on cryptography-related API calls and HTTP-related calls,
both of which are common ways for malware to commu-
nicate with their command-and-control (C&C servers). We
note that these extracted insights are not exclusive to mal-
ware, since legitimate Internet browser applications per-
form similar activities. In fact, this lends insight into the
shortcomings of our benign dataset and what types of be-
nign software we may be missing to improve the reliability
of our classifier.
The API sequence call has been shown to be a weak fea-
ture in past work [21]. Using the interpretation framework,
we examine whether the API sequence is a weak feature
without relying on domain expertise. Although training this
model resulted in a validation accuracy of 94%, our inter-
pretation results are not intuitive. While the model was con-
fident in classifying one the benign samples (Fig 3), the in-
terpretation on its boundary approximations is ambiguous at
interpreting why this was the case. There are large sections
highlighted as contributing to the classification of the sam-
ple. The most heavily weighted areas make frequent calls
to FindNextFileW and GetProcAddress (among others), but
this isn’t indicative of benign or malicious behavior. When
looking at malicious samples, the results are even more am-
biguous. It seems the model memorized at least one of the
samples entirely as seen in Fig 4.
Figure 3. Interpretation for a benign sample. Each color repre-
sents a unique Windows API call during execution. The large light
green areas in the top image denote support for the benign class.
The dark red areas in the bottom image contradict the support for
the benign class.
Figure 4. Interpretation on a malicious image generated from API
sequences, where each pixel represents a unique Windows API
call during execution. Even though the vision-based classification
scheme correctly predicts this sample as malicious with high confi-
dence, the interpretation method that approximates the boundaries
provides ambiguous explanation.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate the effectiveness of us-
ing computer-vision based techniques for dynamic mal-
ware classification and employing vision-based interpreta-
tion frameworks to explain why the deep learning mod-
els make such predictions. Our discoveries on the two
case studies indicate the promising advantages of applying
vision-based interpretation frameworks to explain image-
based dynamic malware classifiers. Security practition-
ers, based on the algorithmic interpretation findings, can
check the code and verify whether the ML-identified loca-
tions contain a signatures unique to certain malware fami-
lies. We plan to continue studying and proposing interpre-
tation schemes specifically for image-based malware clas-
sification frameworks.
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